Substation electromagnetic mitigation module

ABSTRACT

An electric power substation includes one or more primary relay panels located at a substation site and susceptible to damage caused by radiated or coupled electromagnetic energy, and an electromagnetic pulse mitigation module located at the substation site and comprising a continuous conductive enclosure that is impervious to the radiated or coupled electromagnetic energy. One or more backup relay panels are housed within the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module and capable of assuming operation of the one or more primary relay panels.

BACKGROUND

An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is a super-energetic radio wave that hasthe capability of destroying, damaging, or causing the malfunction ofelectronic systems by overloading their circuits. During an EMP event(burst), such as high altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMP) orintentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI), the metal incorporatedinto electrical devices is essentially turned into a receiving antennafor propagating EMP energy. The EMP energy is generally harmless tohumans but can be catastrophic to critical infrastructure, such aselectric power grids and telecommunications systems.

Electrical substations in most electric power grids are particularlysusceptible to damage from EMP events. Electrical substations commonlyinclude a control house (alternately referred to as a “cubicle”), whichis a freestanding building structure with at least four walls, a roof,and a floor. The control house accommodates vital electrical equipmentrequired to regulate operation of on-site circuit breakers. An EMP eventcan render such electrical equipment inoperable and effectively stopvital power supply to network customers.

One form of EMP that threatens proper operation of electrical substationcontrol houses is radiated EMP energy waves, which propagate throughfree space until absorbed by metallic components of control houseelectrical equipment. Radiating EMP waves can be attenuated byencapsulating the entire control house in a continuous conductiveshield, which provides an enclosure hardened against electromagneticenergy. Retrofitting existing control houses with a continuousconductive shield, however, is costly and oftentimes unfeasible due tothe design requirement that the conductive shield also encapsulates thefloor of the control house to fully protect vital relay equipment housedtherein.

Another form of EMP that threatens electrical substation control housesis coupled EMP energy, which is absorbed by metallic conductors andcarried to the control house electrical equipment via the metallicconductor. High-frequency coupled EMP energy can be mitigated byincorporating electrical filters, such as HEMP filters, which are wiredinto the conductors and operate to clip high amplitude signals. Theconductors can also be shielded and grounded on both ends to mitigateprimary electromagnetic threats. The use of shielded conductors,however, can produce secondary problems since the effectiveness of theshielding can be compromised in the presence of two grounds.

If the vast majority of electrical substations are unprotected from EMPthreats, a widespread outage or failure due to electromagneticinterference could have disastrous effects. For these and other reasons,improvements are desirable.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The following figures are included to illustrate certain aspects of thepresent disclosure, and should not be viewed as exclusive embodiments.The subject matter disclosed is capable of considerable modifications,alterations, combinations, and equivalents in form and function, withoutdeparting from the scope of this disclosure.

FIG. 1 is a generalized schematic of an example electric powersubstation that may incorporate the principles of the present disclosure

FIG. 2A is an isometric view of an example embodiment of theelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module of FIG. 1.

FIG. 2B is a schematic side view of the electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule.

FIG. 2C is a schematic back view of the electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule.

FIG. 2D is a schematic front view of the electromagnetic pulsemitigation module.

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of another example electric powersubstation that may incorporate one or more principles of the presentdisclosure.

FIGS. 4A and 4B are isometric and front views, respectively, of anexample embodiment of the first electromagnetic pulse mitigation moduleof FIG. 3, according to one or more embodiments.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The present disclosure is related to mitigating electromagnetic threatsto electrical power substations and, more particularly, to anelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module that protects against radiatedand coupled electromagnetic threats and serves as a backup to substationcontrol house electrical equipment.

The embodiments discussed herein describe an electromagnetic pulsemitigation module that mitigates adverse effects of both radiated andcoupled electromagnetic energy on electrical power substations. Theelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module may be activated when an event(e.g., an EMP burst) renders existing protective relay equipment at thesubstation inoperable. The electromagnetic pulse mitigation module maybe designed to be impervious to damaging electromagnetic energy and mayinclude backup protective relay equipment that can assume normaloperation of the damaged existing protective relay equipment whenneeded. Accordingly, the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module mayserve as a redundant feature of the substation that is capable ofoperating in place of damaged protective relay equipment.

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an example electric power substation100 that may incorporate the principles of the present disclosure. Asused herein, the term “electric power substation” or “substation” refersto an electric power facility such as, but not limited to, atransmission substation, a distribution substation, a power generationfacility (including distributed generation), or any combination thereof.While the present disclosure is related generally to protectingsubstations and other electric power facilities, the principlesdescribed herein are equally applicable to other industries orapplications, such as the telecommunications industry or any otherindustry requiring protection from EMP bursts or events.

As illustrated, the substation 100 may include at least one circuitbreaker 102 that receives electrical power from a power plant 104(alternately referred to as a “generator”). The substation 100 may alsoinclude one or more transformers 105 (one shown) that initially receiveand condition the electrical power from the power plant 104 prior toreceipt at the circuit breaker 102. In some embodiments, the circuitbreaker 102 may be encased in a continuous conductive enclosure that issubstantially or entirely impervious to radiated electromagnetic energy.In other embodiments, however, the circuit breaker 102 may be generallyunprotected from radiated electromagnetic energy.

The circuit breaker 102 is communicably coupled to an on-site controlhouse 106 via a primary communication line 108. The primarycommunication line 108 can comprise a plurality of conductors (e.g.,copper wires) that facilitate electrical communication between thecontrol house 106 and the circuit breaker 102. In some cases, theprimary communication line 108 can include about 250 to about 270conductors. One or more primary relay panels 110 are housed within thecontrol house 106 and operate as protective relay and meteringinstruments that communicate with the circuit breaker 102 via theprimary communication line 108. While five primary relay panels 110 aredepicted in FIG. 1, more or less than five may be included in thesubstation 100, without departing from the scope of the disclosure.

During normal operation, the power plant 104 supplies high voltageelectrical power to the circuit breaker 102. The electrical power istransmitted through the circuit breaker 102 and conveyed to a network112 of power consumers 114, such as residential or commercial customers.The primary relay panels 110 monitor and measure the current and voltageconducted through the circuit breaker 102 to the network 112. If a faultor abnormality is detected, such as a decrease in voltage or an increasein current, the primary relay panels 110 send a trip command that opensthe circuit breaker 102 and thereby isolates and protects the network112 from electrical damage.

An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) burst can generate a high voltagedifference in the electrical equipment of the substation 100, which canlead to high induced currents that may overload and render the primaryrelay panels 110 inoperable. In some cases, an EMP burst might generateradiated electromagnetic energy 116 capable of propagating through thewalls of the control house 106 and potentially damaging the primaryrelay panels 110. In other cases, or in addition thereto,electromagnetic energy generated by an EMP burst may be absorbed by theprimary communication line 108 and transmitted to the primary relaypanels 110 in the form of coupled electromagnetic energy 118. Thecoupled electromagnetic energy 118 may also potentially damage theprimary relay panels 110 or otherwise render them inoperable. If theprimary relay panels 110 are damaged, power service (supply) to thepower consumers 114 may cease, and electrical power transmission cannotbe restored to the network 112 until the primary relay panels 110 arerepaired or replaced.

To attenuate the radiated electromagnetic energy 116 from damaging theprimary relay panels 110, the entire control house 106 can beencapsulated in a thick, six-sided metal enclosure, thus creating acontinuous conductive shield. Vulnerabilities created by penetrations inthe conductive shield can be mitigated with waveguides below cut-offRetrofitting the control house 106 with a continuous conductive shield,however, can be cost-prohibitive and impractical since the designrequires that the floor of the control house 106 also be enclosed.

To attenuate the coupled electromagnetic energy 118, one or more in-linefilters may be wired to the conductor 108 to “clip” high amplitudesignals so that they do not damage the connected relay panels 110. Theconductor 108 may also be grounded and bonded at each end in an effortto dissipate the propagating energy. Grounding the conductor 108 at eachend, however, can produce secondary problems such as circulating currentresulting from degradation of the substation ground grid. Thesecirculating currents may create signal noise on control cables andresult in the malfunction or failure of protective relays. Moreover, therisk of circulating current might exist during normal operation, absentan EMP event, and can increase substation maintenance costs.

According to the present disclosure, the adverse consequences ofsubjecting the substation 100 to both radiated and coupledelectromagnetic energy 116, 118 may be mitigated by incorporating anelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module 120. The electromagnetic pulsemitigation module 120 (hereafter the “module 120”) may be locatedon-site at the substation 100, such as housed within the control house106. In other embodiments, however, the module 120 may be arranged at alocation outside of the control house 106, without departing from thescope of the disclosure.

The module 120 houses one or more backup relay panels 122 a and 122 bthat replicate the primary relay panels 110 within the control house106. While only two backup relay panels 122 a,b are depicted in FIG. 1,more or less than two may be employed, without departing from the scopeof the disclosure. The backup relay panels 122 a,b serve as an emergencyredundancy to be activated when the primary relay panels 110 arerendered inoperable by an EMP event. For example, when an EMP burstdisables the primary relay panels 110, operation of the substation 100can be manually or automatically switched to the module 120 and thebackup relay panels 122 a,b will then assume the normal functions of theprimary relay panels 110. Consequently, power disruption to theconsumers 114 may be minimized or entirely avoided.

The module 120 may include a continuous conductive enclosure that isimpervious to the radiated electromagnetic energy 116. Moreover, themodule 120 may be communicably coupled to the circuit breaker 102 via afiber optic line 124, thus also making the module 120 impervious tocoupled electromagnetic energy 118. More specifically, optical fibersare electrically non-conductive, and as such, do not act as an antennathat picks up electromagnetic signals. Consequently, the backup relaypanels 122 a,b may be isolated during an EMP event that would otherwisedisable or damage the primary relay panels 110.

In some embodiments, a merging unit 126 may be arranged at or within thecircuit breaker 102 and may be configured to facilitate communicationbetween the circuit breaker 102 and the module 120 via the fiber opticline 124. Accordingly, the merging unit 126 may at least partiallyoperate as a fiber optic converter, and the module 120 may be primarilydesigned for fiber optic based relaying. While a typical control house(e.g., the control house 106) may include 16-20 individual relay panels(e.g., the primary relay panels 110), using fiber optic technology cancondense the relay panels down into a size that can fit within themodule 120. Consequently, the number of primary relay panels 110 andbackup relay panels 122 a,b may be dissimilar, but the backup relaypanels 122 a,b may nonetheless be able to assume some or all of thenormal functions of each of the primary relay panels 110 when needed.

In some embodiments, and because of the fiber optic capability of themodule 120, the primary relay panels 110 may be reduced in size to beaccommodated within the module 120. In such embodiments, the module 120may effectively operate as the control house 106 itself, and therebyeliminate the need for a redundant protective feature.

The fiber optic line 124 may be configured to operate in a mannersimilar to the primary communication line 108 in communicating with thecircuit breaker 102. Accordingly, the fiber optic line 124 may be ableto transmit data between the module 120 and the circuit breaker 102 andsend a trip or close command to the circuit breaker 102 when needed. Insome embodiments, the fiber optic line 124 may include about twentyindividual optical fibers, but could alternatively include more or lessthan twenty, without departing from the scope of the disclosure. In atleast one embodiment, the fiber optic line 124 may have suitable fiberoptic couplers at the merging unit 126 and the module 120 to facilitateclean and protected data communication between the two locations.

In some embodiments, a backup communication line 128 may also extendbetween and communicably couple the circuit breaker 102 to the module120. As illustrated, the backup communication line 128 may extend fromthe merging unit 126. In at least one embodiment, the backupcommunication line 128 serves as a backup to the fiber optic line 124 inthe event the merging unit 126 is damaged during an EMP burst.Accordingly, the backup communication line 128 may comprise an emergencyredundant feature to the fiber optic line 124 and may be able totransmit a direct trip or close command to the circuit breaker 102bypassing the merging unit 126, if necessary. In other embodiments,however, the backup communication line 128 and the fiber optic line 124may operate simultaneously when the primary relay panels 110 fail orbecome inoperable.

Similar to the primary communication line 108, the backup communicationline 128 may include a plurality of conductors made of a conductivematerial (e.g., copper), and may be shielded, grounded, and bonded toprevent coupled propagation of electromagnetic energy into the module120. In some embodiments, the backup communication line 128 may include15 to 20 conductors, but could alternatively include more or less than15 to 20 conductors. In some embodiments, use of the conductive metallicconductors may be limited to device power to mitigate secondary problemsassociated with present designs utilizing multiple grounding points onshielded analog signal cables.

In some embodiments, the module 120 may include one or more waveguidesbelow cut-off 130 (one shown) and the fiber optic line 124 may enter(penetrate) the interior of the module 120 via the waveguide belowcut-off 130. The waveguide below cut-off 130 may be designed to shieldthe interior volume of the module 120 from exposure to the radiatedelectromagnetic energy 116 exceeding a predetermined magnitude andfrequency. To accomplish this, the waveguide below cut-off 130 may haveone or more honeycomb-shaped or otherwise stacked shapes and arrangedapertures. The apertures of the waveguide below cut-off 130 may beselectively sized to filter signals up to a minimum of 10 GHz. In someembodiments, the module 120 may further include one or more ground lugsor ground clamps (see FIG. 2C) configured to help dissipate energy.

In some embodiments, the waveguide below cut-off 130 includes individualcells having a diameter sufficient for a cutoff frequency of 10 GHzminimum with minimum attenuation of 80 dB at this frequency. The seamsbetween the module 120 and the waveguide below cut-off 130 may becontinuously welded or an electromagnetically conductive gasket may beused to ensure continuous protection.

In some embodiments, a signal filter 132 may be coupled to the backupcommunication line 128 and arranged in-line to attenuate high frequencysignals. Accordingly, the signal filter 132 may be configured to provideprotection against power surges, such as those caused by EMP orintentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI). In one embodiment, thesignal filter 132 is configured to filter electromagnetic signalscarried on the backup communication line 128 to a minimum of 10 GHz. Anumber of commercially-available signal filters may be used toaccomplish this. In at least one embodiment, for example, the signalfilter 132 may comprise a HEMP filter.

In some embodiments, while the primary relay panels 110 are active andotherwise operational, the module 120 may remain inactive. In otherembodiments, however, the module 120 may operate as a data collectiondevice while the primary relay panels 110 operate. To accomplish this,the module 120 may include a remote terminal unit (RTU) 134 positionedwithin the module 120 and configured to undertake supervisory controland data acquisition (SCADA). The RTU 134 may serve as a backup to aprimary RTU 136 that may be included in the control house 106 andassociated with the primary relay panels 110. Accordingly, the backupRTU 134 may be configured to monitor and process some or all of the samedata that is processed and monitored by the primary RTU 136.

Similar to the primary RTU 136, the backup RTU 134 may be configured tocontrol power system devices and/or monitor and communicate power systemmeasurements as well as statuses to remote locations for power systemoperation. For example, the backup RTU 134 may be programmed to obtainvarious system data points, such as mode, voltage, status of the circuitbreaker 102 (i.e., open, closed, etc.), and other data. If there is afault event, the data obtained by the backup RTU 134 will be able toshow where the fault event occurred, the distance from the substation100, and what the magnitude of the fault was. In the event the primaryRTU 136 is damaged during an EMP burst, fault event data obtained by theprimary RTU 136 may be lost, but the fault event data of the backup RTU134 may be protected and accessible.

Data obtained by the backup RTU 134 may be transmitted to a remoteoperation center via a wired (e.g., fiber optic) or wirelesstelecommunications network. In some embodiments, the data obtained bythe backup RTU 134 may be stored locally and may be obtained manuallyonsite, or may otherwise be transmitted on command or at predeterminedintervals. In other embodiments, the data obtained by the backup RTU 134may be transmitted continuously or intermittently to the remoteoperation center for consideration.

The control house 106 may include an intentional electromagneticinterference (IEMI) detector 138 for detecting spikes in radiatingelectromagnetic energy external to the control house 106. In someembodiments, the module 120 may further include a backup IEMI detector140 positioned within the module 120. Since it is housed within themodule 120, the backup IEMI detector 140 may be configured to monitorthe shielding integrity of the module 120 and the environment outsidethe shield. If the backup IEMI detector 140 detects EMP energy (eitherradiated or coupled), that is an indication that the electromagneticshield of the module 120 has been breached. No signal should be detectedor transmitted as long as the electromagnetic shield provided by themodule 120 remains intact (functioning). Rather, the IEMI detector 140need only communicate when there is a breach. Moreover, there may notever be a need to access the interior of the module 120 unless the IEMIdetector 140 senses a breach.

In some embodiments, the module 120 may also include a power supply 142configured to provide electrical power to various equipment includedwithin the module 120, such as the backup RTU 134 and the IEMI detector140. In some embodiments, the power supply 142 may also power themerging unit 126 via the backup communication line 128. In at least oneembodiment, the power supply 142 may comprise a limited use directcurrent (DC) or alternating current (AC) system that includes anuninterruptable power supply (UPS) and batteries.

In some embodiments, the substation 100 may also include ageomagnetically induced current (GIC) sensor 144. Briefly, the GICsensor 144 is communicably coupled to the transformer(s) 105 and incommunication with a protective relay housed within the module 120 via afiber optic cable 146. The GIC sensor 144 comprises a neutral currenttransformer providing direct current (DC) measurements to the protectiverelay, which monitors GIC values, such as sun storm bursts, and operatesto trip the circuit breaker 102 (FIG. 1) before the current damages thepower system auto transformer. Alternatively, the GIC monitoring systemcould produce an alarm to initiate assessment and action from a powersystem operator.

Example operation of the module 120 is now provided. The module 120 maybe generally characterized as a passive device. More specifically,besides the data capture capabilities briefly described above, themodule 120 essentially remains inactive until needed. The module 120 maybe fully activated only when an EMP event has occurred and the primaryrelay panels 110 are damaged and/or otherwise rendered inoperable.Radiated electromagnetic energy 116 and/or coupled electromagneticenergy 118 may damage the primary relay panels 110, thereby resulting ina loss of electrical power (e.g., a black out) for the interconnectednetwork 112. The EMP event that renders the primary relay panels 110inoperable, will have little or no detrimental effect on the backuprelay panels 122 a,b within the module 120, which will remain undamagedas long as the electromagnetic shield of the module 120 remains intact.

Once the loss of electrical power at the substation 100 is reported orotherwise sensed, a repair crew may be dispatched to the substation 100.Upon determining that the primary relay panels 110 are damaged orinoperable, operation of the circuit breaker 102 may be transitioned tothe module 120. In some embodiments, this can be done manually with therepair crew by closing switches that connect the control house 106 tothe circuit breaker 102, and subsequently opening switches that enableconnectivity to the module 120. Alternatively, transitioning operationof the circuit breaker 102 to the module 120 may be automated, such asfrom a remote location (e.g., a remote operation center) and using oneor more servos or motors configured to open and close the appropriateswitches.

The module 120 may be characterized as a redundant feature of thesubstation 100 that is capable of replacing (i.e., operating in placeof) the electrical components of the control house 106 when needed.Until the primary relay panels 110 are restored or repaired, the module120 may be used to facilitate power transmission to the network 112through the circuit breaker 102. After the module 120 becomesoperational, the repair crew (and/or the power company) may thencoordinate between the power plant 104 and the required loads from thepower consumers 114 to reestablish service on the network 112. Themodule 120 may help coordinate with the power plant 104 to begin tomatch power generation with the load on the network 112, an operationoften referred to as a “black start generation.”

Until the switch from the control house 106 to the module 120 is made,the module 120 may not have the ability to operate the circuit breaker102. The module 120 may initially be configured as an online standbydevice, requiring no additional configuration for operational use beyondmanual closing of switches. Following field trials, the module 120 mightbe used for normal operations in lieu of traditional protection andcontrol methods.

FIG. 2A is an isometric view of an example embodiment of the module 120,according to one or more embodiments. As illustrated, the module 120 mayexhibit a generally rectangular shape, but could alternatively be in anyother polygonal or non-polygonal shape, without departing from the scopeof the disclosure. For purposes of the present disclosure, however, themodule 120 will be described herein as having six sides comprising atop, a bottom, and four sides that extend generally between the top andthe bottom. More specifically, the module 120 may include a steel frame202 to which is coupled a top 204, a bottom 206, a front wall (notshown), a back wall 208 (occluded), a first sidewall 210 a, and a secondsidewall 210 b, collectively referred to herein as a “shell”. The frontwall is removed to enable viewing of the internal components of themodule 120, but would otherwise be included to enable the shell toprovide a continuous conductive enclosure for the protective relay andcontrol equipment housed within the module 120.

The shell can be constructed from any electromagnetically conductivematerial. Suitable electromagnetically conductive materials include, butare not limited to, steel, aluminum, copper, and any combinationthereof. In at least one embodiment, the electromagnetically conductivematerial may comprise conductive concrete, or concrete that isreinforced or iron impregnated to attenuate radiated EMP signals. Insome embodiments, the electromagnetically conductive material may have athickness sufficient to attenuate electromagnetic signals of 80 dB ormore. In one embodiment for example, the thickness of theelectromagnetically conductive material may range between about 3 mm andabout 6 mm. In one embodiment, the electromagnetically conductivematerial may comprise steel plate of sufficient thickness to otherhazards, such as ballistic threats. Any joints or seams formed at theintersection of two or more pieces of the shell may be continuouslywelded to provide for a complete electromagnetic shield.

The electronics included within the module 120 may require airflow forcooling purposes. To allow airflow from the exterior of the module 120to pass into the protected internal region, a vent 212 may be installedin the module 120 and may extend through the shell. In the illustratedembodiment, the vent 212 is arranged on the top 204 but couldalternatively be positioned at other locations on the shell. The vent212 may include a waveguide beyond cutoff having one or morehoneycomb-shaped or otherwise stacked shapes and arranged aperturesconfigured to shield the interior volume of the module 120 from exposureto electromagnetic signals exceeding a predetermined acceptablemagnitude and frequency.

The first and second sidewalls 210 a,b may each comprise hinged doorscapable of opening to expose or occlude the protective relay and controlequipment arranged within the module 120. In the illustrated embodiment,for example, the first and second sidewalls 210 a,b may be opened toexpose the first backup relay panel 122 a and the second backup relaypanel 122 b, respectively. As discussed above, the backup relay panels122 a,b effectively replicate the primary relay panels 110 (FIG. 1) andserve as an emergency redundancy to be activated when an event (e.g., anEMP burst) renders the primary relay panels 110 inoperable.Consequently, the backup relay panels 122 a,b may be capable of assumingsome or all of the normal functions of the primary relay panels 110 whenneeded.

The first and second backup relay panels 122 a,b may include some or allof the same protective relay and control equipment. Accordingly, thefollowing description of the second relay panel 122 b may be equallyapplicable to the first relay panel 122 a. As illustrated, the secondbackup relay panel 122 b may include a plurality of relay switches 214operable to open and close communication to the circuit breaker 102(FIG. 1). While the relay switches 214 are shown as control handles, itwill be appreciated that the relay switches 214 may alternativelycomprise buttons or any other actuation mechanism that facilitatesopening or closing communication with the circuit breaker 102. In someembodiments, the relay switches 214 may be manually operated, but couldalternatively be automated using suitable servo motors or otherelectromechanical equipment that may be operated remotely.

The second backup relay panel 122 b may further include a plurality ofprotective relays 216 configured to trip the circuit breaker 102(FIG. 1) when a fault is detected. In at least one embodiment, one ormore of the protective relays may comprise a protective relay deviceutilizing fiber optic communications.

FIG. 2B is a schematic side view of the module 120, according to one ormore embodiments, and depicts the first sidewall 210 a. As illustrated,the first sidewall 210 a may include one or more hinges 218 thatfacilitate pivoting movement of the first sidewall 210 a between openand closed positions. In at least one embodiment, one or more latches220 may be included on the first sidewall 210 a to allow a user tomanually open and/or close the second sidewall. When closed, the latches220 secure the first sidewall 210 a in the closed position. As will beappreciated, similar components and function may be equally applicableto the second sidewall 210 b (FIG. 2A), but are not described herein forthe sake of brevity.

Also depicted in FIG. 2B is a sub-enclosure 222 that may be mounted tothe back wall 208 of the module 120, such as by being welded to the backwall 208. In some embodiments, a cable entry module 224 may be coupledto or otherwise included in the sub-enclosure 222. Alternatively, thecable entry module 224 may be mounted to the back wall 208, withoutdeparting from the scope of the disclosure. The cable entry module 224provides a location where the backup communication line 128 (FIG. 1) maypenetrate the module 120 and helps facilitate bonding and grounding ofthe backup communication line 128 to mitigate coupled energypropagation. Additionally, the cable entry module 224 may shieldradiated energy at attenuation levels equal to the enclosure.

In some embodiments, the signal filter 132 may also be coupled to theback wall 208, but could alternatively be included at other locations onthe module 120, without departing from the scope of the disclosure. Asdescribed above, the signal filter 132 may be configured to filter thepower signals that enter the module 120, and thereby help prevent damageto electronic devices from coupled electromagnetic energy.

FIG. 2C is a schematic back view of the module 120, according to one ormore embodiments, and depicts the back wall 208 of the module 120. Insome embodiments, as illustrated, the sub-enclosure 222 may include anemergency sub-enclosure 226 a and a power/control sub-enclosure 226 b,and each may have a removable cover (panel) to access internalcomponents of the sub-enclosure 222. The emergency sub-enclosure 226 amay only be used in case of an emergency. The cover may be removed andthe emergency sub-enclosure 226 a may then provide access into theinterior of the module 120, such as to run cables or the like into theinterior. The power/control sub-enclosure 226 b may include the cableentry module 224. Moreover, in some embodiments, an output signal filter228 (shown in dashed lines) may be included in the power/controlsub-enclosure 226 b and may be used to route power out of the module120. In some embodiments, for example, power routed out of the module120 via the output signal filter 228 may power the merging unit 126(FIG. 1). Similar to the signal filter 132, the output signal filter 228filters the power signals so that coupled electromagnetic energy cannotpenetrate the module 120 and damage internal electronic devices.

As illustrated, the waveguide below cut-off 130 may be arranged on theback wall 208 and may provide a location where one or more fiber opticlines (e.g., the fiber optic line 124 of FIG. 1) and/or conductors maypass into the interior of the module 120. In some embodiments, one ormore fiber optic feedthrough ports 230 may also be mounted to the backwall 208 (or alternatively mounted to the sub-enclosure 222) and mayalso provide a location where one or more fiber optic lines (e.g., thefiber optic line 124 of FIG. 1) may pass into the interior of the module120. In some embodiments, the waveguide below cut-off 130 and the fiberoptic feedthrough ports 230 may help shield the interior volume of themodule 120 from exposure to radiated electromagnetic energy 116 (FIG. 1)exceeding a predetermined magnitude and frequency.

As indicated above, the module 120 may further include one or moreground lugs 229 and/or one or more ground clamps 231, each of which mayhelp dissipate energy from the module 120, as needed.

FIG. 2D is a schematic front view of the module 120, according to one ormore embodiments, and depicts an interior 232 of the module 120 with thefirst and second sidewalls 210 a,b in partially opened positions. Asillustrated, the backup RTU 134, the backup IEMI detector 140, and thepower supply 142 are all housed within the interior 232 of the module120. As mentioned above, the IEMI detector 140 may be positioned withinthe interior 232 to continuously monitor the integrity of the shield andthe environment outside the shield. In the event electromagnetic noiseis sensed, the IEMI detector 140 may be configured to generate one ormore alarms indicating the shielding effectiveness of the shell has beencompromised or an external event has occurred. In some embodiments,these alarms may be stored on the RTU 134 within the shell andtransmitted to system operations personnel for proactive repair of themodule 120 shielding or response to an event at the substation.

In one or more embodiments, the first and second sidewalls 210 a,b mayincorporate a compressible finger stock 234 in a single or double “knifeedge” configuration installed along the outer perimeter of the sidewalls210 a,b. As will be appreciated, the compressible finger stock 234 mayprove advantageous in augmenting the EMP/HEMP shielding as required bythe module 120.

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of another example electric powersubstation 300 that may incorporate one or more principles of thepresent disclosure. The substation 300 may be similar in some respectsto the substation 100 of FIG. 1 and therefore may be best understoodwith reference thereto, where like numerals will represent likecomponents not described again in detail. As illustrated, the substation300 receives electrical power from the power plant 104 and includes thecontrol house 106, which houses the primary relay panels 110.

Unlike the substation 100 of FIG. 1, however, the substation 300includes multiple circuit breakers, shown as a first circuit breaker 102a, a second circuit breaker 102 b, and a third circuit breaker 102 c.While three circuit breakers 102 a-c are depicted in FIG. 3, more orless than three may be employed, without departing from the scope of thedisclosure. Each circuit breaker 102 a-c may communicate with theprimary relay panels 110 via the primary communication line 108. Duringnormal operation, the power plant 104 supplies high voltage electricalpower to the circuit breakers 102 a-c, and the electrical power istransmitted through the circuit breakers 102 a-c and conveyed to thenetwork 112 of power consumers 114. In some embodiments, as illustrated,the circuit breakers 102 a-c may jointly provide power to the network112 via a single line. In other embodiments, however, one or more of thecircuit breakers 102 a-c may provide power independently. The primaryrelay panels 110 monitor and measure the current and voltage conductedthrough the circuit breakers 102 a-c to the network 112. If a fault orabnormality is detected, the primary relay panels 110 send a tripcommand that opens one or more of the circuit breakers 102 a-c andthereby isolates and protects the network 112 from electrical damage.

In some embodiments, one or more of the circuit breakers 102 a-c mayfurther include an electromagnetic pulse mitigation module, shown as afirst module 302 a, a second module 302 b, and a third module 302 c.Each module 302 a-c may be used to help protect vital electricalequipment from both radiated and coupled electromagnetic energy 116,118. In at least one embodiment, as illustrated, each module 302 a-c maybe attached or otherwise coupled to the exterior of the correspondingcircuit breaker 102 a-c. In other embodiments, however, one or more ofthe modules 302 a-c may be arranged inside the corresponding circuitbreaker 102 a-c, without departing from the scope of the disclosure.While FIG. 3 depicts a module 302 a-c associated with each circuitbreaker 102 a-c, it is contemplated herein that one or more of thecircuit breakers 102 a-c may not include an associated module 302 a-c.

In some embodiments, the module 120 as generally described above may beincluded in the substation 300 and each module 302 a-c may communicatewith the module 120. Such embodiments may be referred to as a“centralized” solution. In other embodiments, however, the module 120may be omitted and the modules 302 a-c may include redundant features ofthe substation 300 that are capable of replacing (i.e., operating inplace of) the electrical components of the control house 106 whenneeded. Such embodiments may be referred to as a “distributed” solution.In yet other embodiments, it is contemplated to have a combinationcentralized and distributed solution where the module 120 and themodules 302 a-c each provide redundant features of the substation 300capable of operating in place of the electrical components of thecontrol house 106, without departing from the scope of the disclosure.

Each module 302 a-c houses or otherwise contains an input/output device304. In some embodiments, at least one of the input/output devices 304(hereafter “I/O devices 304”) may comprise a merging unit, similar tothe merging unit 126 of FIG. 1. The I/O device 304 comprising themerging unit may communicate with the module 120 and the other I/Odevices 304 via a fiber optic line 306, which may be similar to thefiber optic line 124 of FIG. 1. The fiber optic line 306 may be able totransmit data between the module 120 and the circuit breakers 102 a-cand send a trip or close command to close the circuit breakers 102 a-cwhen needed. Accordingly, the I/O device(s) 204 may at least partiallyoperate as a fiber optic converter, and the modules 302 a-c may beprimarily designed for fiber optic based relaying.

In embodiments where the module 120 is omitted, or in addition toembodiments including the module 120, one or more of the I/O devices 304may comprise backup relays that replicate the relays of the primaryrelay panels 110 within the control house 106. Similar to the backuprelay panels 122 a,b of the module 120, the backup relays of the I/Odevices 304 may serve as an emergency redundancy to be activated whenthe primary relay panels 110 are rendered inoperable by an EMP event.When an EMP burst disables the primary relay panels 110, operation ofthe substation 300 can be manually or automatically switched to themodules 302 a-c and the backup relays contained within the modules 302a-c will then assume the normal functions of the primary relay panels110. Consequently, power disruption to the consumers 114 may beminimized or entirely avoided.

Similar to the module 120, each module 302 a-c may include a continuousconductive enclosure that is impervious to the radiated electromagneticenergy 116. Moreover, since communication is facilitated via the fiberoptic line 306, the modules 302 a-c may also be impervious to coupledelectromagnetic energy 118. In some embodiments, and because of thefiber optic capability of the modules 302 a-c, the primary relay panels110 may be reduced in size and accommodated within the modules 302 a-c.In such embodiments, the modules 302 a-c may effectively operate as thecontrol house 106, and thereby eliminate the need for the control house106 or redundant electrical components.

In some embodiments, a backup communication line 308 may also extendbetween the module 120 and the circuit breakers 102 a-c. In embodimentsomitting the module 120, the backup communication line 308 may extendonly between the modules 302 a-c. Similar to the primary communicationline 108, the backup communication line 308 may include a plurality ofconductors made of a conductive material (e.g., copper), and may beshielded, grounded, and bonded to prevent coupled propagation ofelectromagnetic energy into the modules 302 a-c.

In at least one embodiment, the backup communication line 308 serves asa backup to the fiber optic line 306 in the event the I/O devices 304(e.g., the merging units) are damaged during an EMP burst. Accordingly,the backup communication line 308 may comprise an emergency redundantfeature to the fiber optic line 306 and may be able to transmit a tripor close command to the circuit breakers 102 a-c when needed. In otherembodiments, however, the backup communication line 308 and the fiberoptic line 306 may operate simultaneously when the primary relay panels110 fail or become inoperable.

In some embodiments, the modules 302 a-c may include one or morewaveguides below cut-off, and the fiber optic line 306 may enter(penetrate) the interior of the modules 302 a-c via the waveguide belowcut-off. The waveguides below cut-off may be similar to the waveguidebelow cutoff 130 of the module 120 and may operate comparably.

In some embodiments, one or more of the modules 302 a-c may also includea signal filter coupled to the backup communication line 308 andarranged in-line to attenuate high frequency signals. The signalfilter(s) may be similar to the signal filter 132 of the module 120 andthus configured to provide protection against power surges, such asthose caused by EMP or intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI).

In embodiments including the module 120, the power supply 142 mayprovide electrical power to the I/O devices 304 and other equipmentincluded within the modules 302 a-c via the backup communication line308. In embodiments omitting the module 120, an independent power supplymay be housed within an EMP hardened enclosure and coupled to themodules 302 a-c via the communication line 308. In such embodiments, thepower supply may be positioned within the control house 106 or any otherlocation at the substation 300. In yet other embodiments, at least oneof the modules 302 a-c may include an independent power supply used topower each module 302 a-c.

While not depicted in FIG. 3, it is contemplated herein that one or moreof the modules 302 a-c may further include a remote terminal unit (e.g.,the RTU 134 of FIG. 1) configured to undertake supervisory control anddata acquisition (SCADA). Moreover, one or more of the modules 302 a-cmay further include a backup IEMI detector (e.g., the backup IEMIdetector 140 of FIG. 1). The backup IEMI detector may be configured tomonitor the shielding integrity of the associated module 302 a-c andcommunicate an alert signal when a breach of the continuous conductiveenclosure is detected (measured).

The modules 302 a-c may be fully activated when an EMP event hasoccurred and the primary relay panels 110 are damaged and/or otherwiserendered inoperable. Radiated electromagnetic energy 116 and/or coupledelectromagnetic energy 118 may damage the primary relay panels 110, butwill have little or no detrimental effect on the I/O devices 304 withinthe modules 302 a-c, which will remain undamaged as long as theelectromagnetic shield of the modules 302 a-c remains intact. Until theprimary relay panels 110 are restored or repaired, the modules 302 a-cmay be used to facilitate power transmission to the network 112 throughthe circuit breakers 102 a-c.

FIGS. 4A and 4B are isometric and front views, respectively, of anexample embodiment of the first module 302 a of FIG. 3, according to oneor more embodiments. The first module 302 a may be representative of anyor all of the modules 302 a-c of FIG. 3 and, therefore, the followingdescription may be equally applicable to the second and third modules302 b,c. As illustrated, the module 302 a may exhibit a generallyrectangular shape, but could alternatively be in any other polygonal ornon-polygonal shape, without departing from the scope of the disclosure.The module 302 a may include a top 402, a bottom 404, a front wall (notshown), a back wall 406 (occluded), a first sidewall 408 a, and a secondsidewall 408 b, collectively referred to herein as a “shell”. The shellof the module 302 a may be made of any of the materials mentioned hereinwith respect to the shell of the module 120 of FIGS. 2A-2D. In at leastone embodiment, the module 302 a may comprise a square box exhibiting 2ft×2 ft dimensions, but could alternatively exhibit other dimensionswithout departing from the scope of the disclosure.

The front wall is omitted to enable viewing of the internal componentsof the module 302 a, but would otherwise be included to enable the shellto provide a continuous conductive enclosure for the I/O device 304 andany other equipment housed within the module 302 a. As indicated above,the I/O device 304 may comprise a merging unit similar to the mergingunit 126 of FIG. 1. In other embodiments, or in addition thereto, theI/O device 304 may comprise one or more backup relays, such as relayswitches (e.g., the relay switches 214 of FIG. 2A) and/or protectiverelays (e.g., the protective relays 216 of FIG. 2A).

A cable entry module 410 may penetrate the first sidewall 408 a andprovide a location where the fiber optic line 306 (FIG. 3) and thebackup communication line 308 (FIG. 3) may enter the module 302 a. Oneor more terminal blocks 412 may be positioned within the module 302 aand used to route the fiber optic line 306 and the backup communicationline 308 to and from the cable entry module 410. The cable entry module410 helps facilitate bonding and grounding of shielded conductivecables, such as the backup communication line 308 (FIG. 3), to mitigatecoupled energy propagation. Additionally, the cable entry module 410 mayshield radiated energy at attenuation levels equal to the enclosure(i.e., the shell).

To protect the internal components of the module 302 a from radiated andcoupled electromagnetic energy 116, 118 (FIG. 3), the cable entry module410 may include one or both of a waveguide below cut-off and a signalfilter. The waveguide below cut-off may be designed to shield theinterior volume of the module 302 a from exposure to radiatedelectromagnetic energy exceeding a predetermined magnitude andfrequency, such as signals up to a minimum of 10 GHz with minimumattenuation of 80 dB. The seams between the module 302 a and thewaveguide below cut-off may be continuously welded or anelectromagnetically conductive gasket may be used to ensure continuousprotection. The signal filter may be configured to filterelectromagnetic signals carried on the backup communication line 308.The signal filter may be similar to the signal filter 132 of FIG. 1, andmay be capable of filtering signals to a minimum of 10 GHz. In at leastone embodiment, the signal filter may comprise a HEMP filter.

In some embodiments, the module 302 a may further include one or moresurge suppression devices 414 configured to protect the I/O device 304.Example surge suppression devices 414 include, but are not limited to, ametal-oxide varistor (MOV), a transient voltage suppressor (TVS) diode,and other functionally similar devices.

While the foregoing embodiments are related primarily to EMP events andblasts (bursts) that may disable certain electronic equipment of anelectrical power substation, the principles of the present disclosureare equally applicable to scenarios where electronic equipment of anelectrical power substation is damaged or otherwise rendered inoperablethrough other disaster events. Other disaster events can include, butare not limited to a flood, a fire, an earthquake, a sun burst, or anyother event that might damage the existing relay panels. In suchscenarios, the modules 120, 302 a-c may further include one or moresensors that might detect such events. Accordingly, the presentlydescribed module is not limited to EMP events, but may instead bereferred to as a generalized resiliency module since it can be resilientto multiple types of hazards.

Moreover, the modules 120, 302 a-c may be positioned or otherwiseequipped to withstand such events or hazards. For example, the modules120, 302 a-c may be mounted on shock absorbers to mitigate damagingvibration caused by earthquakes that would otherwise damage theprotective relay equipment. The modules 120, 302 a-c may also befireproof to mitigate damage caused by fire. The modules 120, 302 a-cmay further be waterproof or otherwise arranged at a height to place themodules 120, 302 a-c out of a flood plane to thereby mitigate damagecaused by potential flooding.

Embodiments disclosed herein include:

A. An electric power substation that includes a circuit breaker thatreceives electrical power from a power plant, a control housecommunicably coupled to the circuit breaker via a primary communicationline, wherein one or more primary relay panels are housed within thecontrol house, an electromagnetic pulse mitigation module communicablycoupled to the circuit breaker via a fiber optic line and comprising acontinuous conductive enclosure that is impervious to radiated andcoupled electromagnetic energy, and one or more backup relay panelshoused within the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module and capable ofassuming operation of the one or more primary relay panels.

B. An electric power substation that includes a circuit breaker thatreceives electrical power from a power plant, a control housecommunicably coupled to the circuit breaker via a primary communicationline, wherein one or more primary relay panels are housed within thecontrol house, an electromagnetic pulse mitigation module communicablycoupled to the circuit breaker and comprising a continuous conductiveenclosure that is impervious to radiated and coupled electromagneticenergy, and an input/output device housed within the electromagneticpulse mitigation module.

C. A method of operating an electric power substation that includesreceiving electrical power from a power plant at a circuit breakerlocated at the electrical power substation, wherein the electrical powersubstation includes a control house communicably coupled to the circuitbreaker via a primary communication line, and wherein one or moreprimary relay panels are housed within the control house, transitioningoperation of the circuit breaker to an electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule communicably coupled to the circuit breaker via a fiber opticline and comprising a continuous conductive enclosure that is imperviousto radiated and coupled electromagnetic energy, and assuming operationof the one or more primary relay panels with one or more backup relaypanels housed within the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module.

Each of embodiments A, B, and C may have one or more of the followingadditional elements in any combination: Element 1: wherein the circuitbreaker includes a merging unit that facilitates communication betweenthe circuit breaker and the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module.Element 2: wherein the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module comprisesa first electromagnetic pulse mitigation module and the substationfurther comprises a second electromagnetic pulse mitigation modulecommunicably coupled to the circuit breaker and comprising a continuousconductive enclosure that is impervious to radiated and coupledelectromagnetic energy, wherein the merging unit is located within thesecond electromagnetic pulse mitigation module. Element 3: furthercomprising a backup communication line that communicably couples thecircuit breaker to the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module, whereinthe backup communication line is shielded and grounded to preventcoupled propagation of electromagnetic energy into the electromagneticpulse mitigation module. Element 4: a waveguide below cutoff coupled tothe electromagnetic pulse mitigation module, wherein the fiber opticline penetrates the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module via thewaveguide below cut-off, and a signal filter that filters signals in thebackup communication line prior to entering the electromagnetic pulsemitigation module. Element 5: further comprising one or more of a remoteterminal unit positioned within the electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule to undertake supervisory control and data acquisition, anintentional electromagnetic interference detector positioned within theelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module, and a power supply positionedwithin the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module. Element 6: whereinthe continuous conductive enclosure is made of an electromagneticallyconductive material selected from the group consisting of steel,aluminum, copper, conductive concrete, and any combination thereof.

Element 7: wherein the input/output device comprises at least one of amerging unit and one or more backup relay panels capable of assumingoperation of the one or more primary relay panels. Element 8: furthercomprising a surge suppression device housed within the electromagneticpulse mitigation module to protect the input/output device. Element 9:wherein the continuous conductive enclosure is made of anelectromagnetically conductive material selected from the groupconsisting of steel, aluminum, copper, conductive concrete, and anycombination thereof. Element 10: wherein the circuit breaker comprises aplurality of circuit breakers and the electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule comprises a plurality of electromagnetic pulse mitigation moduleseach coupled to a corresponding one of the plurality of circuitbreakers, wherein the substation further comprises a fiber optic linethat facilitates communication between the plurality of circuitbreakers, and a backup communication line extending between theplurality of electromagnetic pulse mitigation modules, wherein thebackup communication line is shielded and grounded to prevent coupledpropagation of electromagnetic energy into the plurality ofelectromagnetic pulse mitigation modules. Element 11: further comprisinga waveguide below cutoff coupled to each electromagnetic pulsemitigation module, wherein the fiber optic line penetrates the pluralityof electromagnetic pulse mitigation modules via the waveguide belowcut-off, and a signal filter that filters signals in the backupcommunication line prior to entering each electromagnetic pulsemitigation module. Element 12: wherein the electromagnetic pulsemitigation module comprises a first electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule and the substation further comprises a second electromagneticpulse mitigation module communicably coupled to the firstelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module via a fiber optic line andcomprising a continuous conductive enclosure that is impervious toradiated and coupled electromagnetic energy, and one or more backuprelay panels housed within the second electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule and capable of assuming operation of the one or more primaryrelay panels, wherein the input/output device comprises a merging unitthat facilitates communication between the circuit breaker and thesecond electromagnetic pulse mitigation module. Element 13: furthercomprising a backup communication line that communicably couples thefirst electromagnetic pulse mitigation module to the secondelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module, wherein the backupcommunication line is shielded and grounded to prevent coupledpropagation of electromagnetic energy into the first or secondelectromagnetic pulse mitigation modules. Element 14: further comprisinga first waveguide below cutoff coupled to the first electromagneticpulse mitigation module, a second waveguide below cutoff coupled to thesecond electromagnetic pulse mitigation module, wherein the fiber opticline penetrates the first and second electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodules via the first and second waveguides below cut-off, respectively,and a signal filter that filters signals in the backup communicationline prior to entering each electromagnetic pulse mitigation module.

Element 15: facilitating communication between the circuit breaker andthe electromagnetic pulse mitigation module with a merging unit includedin the circuit breaker. Element 16: wherein the electromagnetic pulsemitigation module comprises a first electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule and the method further comprises housing the merging unit withina second electromagnetic pulse mitigation module communicably coupled tothe circuit breaker and comprising a continuous conductive enclosurethat is impervious to radiated and coupled electromagnetic energy.Element 17: further comprising communicably coupling the circuit breakerto the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module with a backupcommunication line that is shielded and grounded to prevent coupledpropagation of electromagnetic energy into the electromagnetic pulsemitigation module. Element 18: further comprising penetrating theelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module the fiber optic line via awaveguide below cutoff coupled to the electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule, and filtering signals in the backup communication line with asignal filter prior to entering the electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule.

By way of non-limiting example, exemplary combinations applicable to A,B, and C include: Element 1 with Element 2; Element 3 with Element 4;Element 7 with Element 8; Element 10 with Element 11; Element 12 withElement 13; Element 13 with Element 14; Element 15 with Element 16; andElement 17 with Element 18.

Therefore, the disclosed systems and methods are well adapted to attainthe ends and advantages mentioned as well as those that are inherenttherein. The particular embodiments disclosed above are illustrativeonly, as the teachings of the present disclosure may be modified andpracticed in different but equivalent manners apparent to those skilledin the art having the benefit of the teachings herein. Furthermore, nolimitations are intended to the details of construction or design hereinshown, other than as described in the claims below. It is thereforeevident that the particular illustrative embodiments disclosed above maybe altered, combined, or modified and all such variations are consideredwithin the scope of the present disclosure. The systems and methodsillustratively disclosed herein may suitably be practiced in the absenceof any element that is not specifically disclosed herein and/or anyoptional element disclosed herein. While compositions and methods aredescribed in terms of “comprising,” “containing,” or “including” variouscomponents or steps, the compositions and methods can also “consistessentially of” or “consist of” the various components and steps. Allnumbers and ranges disclosed above may vary by some amount. Whenever anumerical range with a lower limit and an upper limit is disclosed, anynumber and any included range falling within the range is specificallydisclosed. In particular, every range of values (of the form, “fromabout a to about b,” or, equivalently, “from approximately a to b,” or,equivalently, “from approximately a-b”) disclosed herein is to beunderstood to set forth every number and range encompassed within thebroader range of values. Also, the terms in the claims have their plain,ordinary meaning unless otherwise explicitly and clearly defined by thepatentee. Moreover, the indefinite articles “a” or “an,” as used in theclaims, are defined herein to mean one or more than one of the elementsthat it introduces. If there is any conflict in the usages of a word orterm in this specification and one or more patent or other documentsthat may be incorporated herein by reference, the definitions that areconsistent with this specification should be adopted.

As used herein, the phrase “at least one of” preceding a series ofitems, with the terms “and” or “or” to separate any of the items,modifies the list as a whole, rather than each member of the list (i.e.,each item). The phrase “at least one of” allows a meaning that includesat least one of any one of the items, and/or at least one of anycombination of the items, and/or at least one of each of the items. Byway of example, the phrases “at least one of A, B, and C” or “at leastone of A, B, or C” each refer to only A, only B, or only C; anycombination of A, B, and C; and/or at least one of each of A, B, and C.

What is claimed is:
 1. An electric power substation, comprising: one ormore primary relay panels located at a substation site and susceptibleto damage caused by radiated or coupled electromagnetic energy; anelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module located at the substation siteand comprising a continuous conductive enclosure that is impervious tothe radiated or coupled electromagnetic energy; one or more backup relaypanels housed within the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module andcapable of assuming operation of the one or more primary relay panels;and a power supply positioned within the electromagnetic pulsemitigation module to supply electrical power to electrical componentshoused within the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module.
 2. Thesubstation of claim 1, further comprising: a circuit breaker located atthe substation site and communicably coupled to the one or more primaryrelay panels and the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module, thecircuit breaker communicating with the electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule via a fiber optic line; and a waveguide below cutoff coupled tothe electromagnetic pulse mitigation module, wherein the fiber opticline penetrates the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module via thewaveguide below cut-off.
 3. The substation of claim 2, furthercomprising: a backup communication line extending between the circuitbreaker and the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module, wherein thebackup communication line is shielded and grounded at theelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module to prevent ingress of coupledpropagation of electromagnetic energy into the electromagnetic pulsemitigation module; and a signal filter coupled to the backupcommunication line to filter signals in the backup communication lineprior to entering the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module.
 4. Thesubstation of claim 2, wherein the continuous conductive enclosurecomprises a first continuous conductive enclosure and the circuitbreaker is encased in a second continuous conductive enclosure that isimpervious to the radiated or coupled electromagnetic energy.
 5. Thesubstation of claim 1, further comprising a circuit breaker located atthe substation site, wherein the power supply further supplieselectrical power to a merging unit positioned within the circuitbreaker.
 6. The substation of claim 1, further comprising: a primaryremote terminal unit in communication with the one or more primary relaypanels and undertaking supervisory control and data acquisition; and abackup remote terminal unit positioned within the electromagnetic pulsemitigation module and operable to assume operation of the primary remoteterminal unit.
 7. The substation of claim 1, further comprising: aprimary intentional electromagnetic interference detector incommunication with the one or more primary relay panels; and a backupintentional electromagnetic interference detector positioned within theelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module and operable to assume operationof the primary intentional electromagnetic interference detector.
 8. Amethod of operating an electric power substation, comprising: operatingone or more primary relay panels located at a substation site, the oneor more primary relay panels being susceptible to damage caused byradiated or coupled electromagnetic energy; and transitioning operationof the one or more primary relay panels to one or more backup relaypanels housed within an electromagnetic pulse mitigation module, theelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module comprising a continuousconductive enclosure that is impervious to radiated or coupledelectromagnetic energy and including a power supply to supply electricalpower to electrical components housed within the continuous conductiveenclosure.
 9. The method of claim 8, wherein transitioning operation ofthe one or more primary relay panels to the one or more backup relaypanels comprises: operating a circuit breaker located at the substationsite with the one or more relay panels in communication with the circuitbreaker via a primary communication line; and assuming operation of thecircuit breaker with the one or more backup relay panels incommunication with the circuit breaker via a fiber optic line.
 10. Themethod of claim 9, facilitating communication between the circuitbreaker and the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module with a mergingunit included in the circuit breaker.
 11. The method of claim 9, furthercomprising communicably coupling the circuit breaker to theelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module with a backup communication linethat is shielded and grounded to prevent coupled propagation ofelectromagnetic energy into the electromagnetic pulse mitigation module.12. The method of claim 8, further comprising: undertaking supervisorycontrol and data acquisition with a primary remote terminal unit incommunication with the one or more primary relay panels; and undertakingthe supervisory control and data acquisition with a backup remoteterminal unit positioned within the electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule upon failure of the primary remote terminal unit.
 13. Anelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module, comprising: a continuousconductive enclosure that is impervious to radiated or coupledelectromagnetic energy; one or more backup relay panels housed withinthe continuous conductive enclosure and capable of assuming operation ofone or more primary relay panels of an electric power substation; awaveguide below cutoff mounted to the continuous conductive enclosurefor receipt of a fiber optic line to penetrate the continuous conductiveenclosure; and a cable entry module mounted to the continuous conductiveenclosure for receipt of a backup communication line to penetrate thecontinuous conductive enclosure; and a power supply positioned withinthe continuous conductive enclosure to supply electrical power toelectrical components housed within the electromagnetic pulse mitigationmodule.
 14. The electromagnetic pulse mitigation module of claim 13,wherein the continuous conductive enclosure comprises a frame having atop, a bottom, a front wall, a back wall, and first and secondsidewalls, and wherein at least one of the first and second sidewallscomprises a hinged door.
 15. The electromagnetic pulse mitigation moduleof claim 13, wherein the continuous conductive enclosure is made of anelectromagnetically conductive material selected from the groupconsisting of steel, aluminum, copper, conductive concrete, and anycombination thereof.
 16. The electromagnetic pulse mitigation module ofclaim 13, wherein the one or more backup relay panels include: aplurality of relay switches operable to open and close communication toa circuit breaker; and a plurality of protective relays operable to tripthe circuit breaker when a fault is detected.
 17. The electromagneticpulse mitigation module of claim 13, wherein the cable entry moduleincludes a signal filter operable to filter signals in the backupcommunication line prior to entering the continuous conductiveenclosure.
 18. The electromagnetic pulse mitigation module of claim 13,further comprising: an output signal filter that routes power out of thecontinuous conductive enclosure from the power supply.
 19. Theelectromagnetic pulse mitigation module of claim 13, further comprisingat least one of: a backup remote terminal unit positioned within thecontinuous conductive enclosure to undertake supervisory control anddata acquisition; and a backup intentional electromagnetic interferencedetector positioned within the continuous conductive enclosure.